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WHOSE BEST INTEREST IS IT ANYWAY?: SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS’ LIABILITY FOR STUDENT
INJURY IN VIRGINIA
Alison Landry +
If schools are institutions for teaching and learning, why have they become a
common arena for violence? 1 School violence negatively impacts students and
affects the school’s learning environment. 2 Many parents might assume that
violence prevention in schools is a top priority for school districts and society as
a whole. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to adopt that position
when it held that a school principal, who had failed to alert security to a rumored
fight, did not violate any duty to control the environment for safety. 3 The court
declined to acknowledge a “special relationship” 4 between the principal and the
student because it believed that it would be unwise to subject a school official’s
actions to liability for any resulting harm to students while on school premises. 5
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2011, The University of Alabama. The author would like to thank Professor Harvey Schweitzer
for his guidance and assistance during the writing process. She would also like to thank all of the
staff members and editors of the Catholic University Law Review who helped prepare this Note for
publication. Finally, the author would like to thank her parents, John and Julie, for always giving
her the support and encouragement she needs to go forward and for reading every draft and edit.
1. SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2012 10 (2013),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013036.pdf (“In 2011, data from the National Crime
Victimization Survey showed that more victimizations were committed against students ages 12–
18 at school than away from school. This pattern has been consistent since 2001.” (footnote
omitted)).
2. Id. at 2 (citing Stuart Henry, What Is School Violence? An Integrated Definition, 567
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 16 (2000)). See also Ross MacMillan & John Hagan,
Violence in the Transition to Adulthood: Adolescent Victimization, Education, and Socioeconomic
Attainment in Later Life, 14 J. RES. ADOLESCENCE 127, 131 (2004) (stating that decreased
academic performance and investment often results from teenage experiences with violence); Tonja
R. Nansel et al., Relationships Between Bullying and Violence Among U.S. Youth 157 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 348, 348 (2003) (finding that bullying increases violent behavior
among students); Eric A. Storch et al., Peer Victimization and Social-Psychological Adjustment in
Hispanic and African-American Children, 12 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 439, 440 (2003) (indicating
that the effects of peer-on-peer violence include feelings of loneliness and depression).
3. Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 642–43 (Va. 2012).
4. Special relationships represent an exception to the general rule that an actor does not have
a duty to protect a third person from harm. 1 CHARLES E. FRIEND, PERSONAL INJURY LAW IN
VIRGINIA § 2.4.1 (3d ed. 2013), available at LexisNexis.
5. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643. See also Doe v. Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1251,
1254–55 (D. Kan. 2003) (reserving for a state court the decision of whether a special relationship
existed between a school district and a student because of the public policy involved in answering
the question); Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Va. 1992) (explaining that subjecting a
public official to liability for all actions committed in his official capacity was not in society’s best
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By refusing to establish a special relationship between a school administrator
and his or her students, 6 Virginia has left its students with only the protection
guaranteed by common law negligence. 7 Can Virginia be sure that students will
receive effective supervision from the school if an official is not held
accountable for the consequences of his or her actions? Perhaps the question
should not be whether a public official would be burdened by liability, but
whether students, under the care of the official, would be harmed by a lack of
liability.
In Burns v. Gagnon, 8 a vice principal, W.R. Travis Burns, failed to protect his
student, Gregory Gagnon, from a fight that had been reported to him. 9 Burns
was informed of the rumored fight after a morning meeting, but he failed to alert
security. 10 Later that day, Gagnon was injured in a fight with another student. 11
Subsequently, Gagnon sued Burns, the student who caused his injuries, and
another student who encouraged the fight. 12 A jury found each of them liable
for Gagnon’s injuries and ordered them to pay Gagnon a combined five million
dollars in damages. 13
Burns appealed the circuit court’s judgment regarding Gagnon’s gross
negligence claim against him, and asserted that he did not owe Gagnon a legal
duty. 14 Gagnon cross-appealed, asserting that the issue of gross negligence
should have been presented to the jury. 15 On hearing the appeals, the Supreme

interest, thus differentiating between his duty to society at large and his duty in relation to specified
third persons).
6. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643. Virginia agrees with Rhode Island, where courts have stipulated
that “[e]ven minimal insight reveals” that subjecting an official to potential liability for all of his or
her actions “would lead to hesitation on the part of the state to undertake and perform duties
necessary to the functioning of a free society.” Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545, 549–50 (R.I.
1984) (refusing to recognize a special duty between the parole board and the general public when
a patrolman was shot by a parolee who had been released earlier than statutorily dictated).
7. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 370 (West 2014) (“[T]he measure of precaution which
must be taken by one having a child in his or her care, who stands in no relation to the child except
that he has undertaken to care for it, is that care which a prudent person would exercise under like
circumstances.”). When a person takes responsibility for a child, however, he or she “is not an
insurer of the safety of the child,” and is “required only to use reasonable care commensurate with
the reasonably foreseeable risks of harm.” Whitney v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 225 So. 2d
30, 33 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
8. 727 S.E.2d 634 (Va. 2012).
9. Id. at 639.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 641.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 640–41. Gagnon also appealed the circuit court’s decision that the defendants were
not jointly and severally liable. Id. at 641.
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Court of Virginia held that no special relationship existed between a vice
principal and his students that would have required Burns to prevent the fight. 16
To establish liability in a negligence action, a plaintiff must approve a breach
of an existing legal duty that results in an injury. 17 When the alleged conduct is
that of a third party, the general rule states that “a person owes no duty to control
the conduct of third persons in order to prevent harm to another.” 18 However,
under an exception to the general rule for third party liability, if a court
establishes that a special relationship existed between the parties, liability can
be imposed on an actor who assumed charge or care over a third person who
subsequently harmed another person. 19
This Note will analyze why the Supreme Court of Virginia decision in Burns
should have found that a special relationship existed between Burns and Gagnon.
First, this Note begins with a discussion of third person tort liability and the
special relationship exception. Then, this Note will discuss the relevant laws
pertaining to school responsibility and the rights of students. Additionally, this
Note will survey the special relationships that courts have recognized or rejected
before the Burns decision. Next, this Note will review and analyze the argument
presented by the Burns court. Finally, this Note concludes that the Supreme
Court of Virginia erred in the Burns decision and will demonstrate how case law
and legislation from other jurisdictions support an argument for the existence of
a special relationship between Burns and Gagnon.
I. LIABLE OR NOT LIABLE: LAWS THAT PROTECT INDIVIDUALS FROM HARM BY
OTHERS
A. Creating the Legal Duty of Care: Negligence Liability
To establish liability in a negligence action, one must provide evidence of
damage resulting from a breach of an existing legal duty. 20 A common law duty
of care not to harm another person exists when a sufficient association between

16. Id. at 643.
17. See e.g., Marshall v. Winston, 389 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Va. 1990) (finding the jailer and
sheriff not negligent or in breach of a duty when a man who should have been in jail killed a
widow’s husband); Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375–76 (Va. 1988) (declining to find a special
relationship giving rise to a legal duty between Virginia parole officers and a parolee when the
parolee brutally attacked two women subsequent to his release).
18. Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Fox, 372 S.E.2d at 375); Klingbeil Mgmt. Grp. v.
Vito, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Va. 1987); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va. 1974)).
See 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.4.1.
19. Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315); Fox,
372 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)). See also Dudley v.
Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond Inc., 401 S.E.2d 878, 881 (Va. 1991) (holding that an
operator of a halfway home had the duty to exercise reasonable care over felons living in the home).
20. Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Fox, 373 S.E.2d at 375).
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two parties occurs, and one person endangers the other by his or her action or
inaction. 21
In Virginia, one exception to a negligence action is the “public duty” doctrine.
Virginia courts apply the “public duty” doctrine when someone files a
negligence claim against a public official. 22 The doctrine bars a plaintiff from
bringing the negligence action if the public official was performing “a duty owed
to the public at large.” 23 Specifically, it differentiates between the general public
and specific individuals or groups of people, establishing liability only when
there is a violation of a duty owed to a “specifically identifiable person or class
of persons.” 24
In general, when a third person’s conduct is at issue, Virginia law states that
“[t]here is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent that
third person from causing harm to the plaintiff unless a ‘special relation’ exists
between (a) the defendant and the third person or (b) the defendant and the
plaintiff.” 25 This lack of duty exists because third person conduct, especially
criminal conduct, is not reasonably foreseeable by another person. 26 However,
21. See 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 1.1.1 (determining the level of association by using “time
and space”).
22. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 639 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va. 2007) (finding the doctrine
unnecessary to apply due to the existence of other defenses); Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419,
421 (Va. 1992) (refusing to recognize a civil liability under the public duty doctrine); 1 FRIEND,
supra note 4, § 2.7 (defining Virginia’s interpretation of the doctrine). In Marshall v. Winston, the
Virginia Supreme Court explained the public duty doctrine, stating that:
[I]n negligence claims against a public official, a distinction must be drawn between a
public duty owed by the official to the citizenry at large and a special duty owed to a
specific identifiable person or class of persons . . . Only a violation of the latter duty will
give rise to civil liability of the official.
Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 905 (citing Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545, 548 (R.I. 1984)).
23. Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 905 (citing Orzechowski, 485 A.2d at 549–50 (R.I. 1984)).
24. Id. (citing Orzechowski, 485 A.2d at 548). The public duty doctrine does not bar every
negligence action brought against a public official. See Burns, 639 S.E.2d at 279 (“[T]he public
duty doctrine does not bar a claim of negligence or gross negligence against employees of the
Virginia Department of Transportation.”). See also Burdette, 421 S.E.2d at 421 (allowing a
negligence action to proceed against a deputy sheriff who had a specific duty to the plaintiff). A
special relationship constitutes one exception to the public duty doctrine. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public
Officers and Employees § 330 (West 2014).
25. 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.4.1. See also Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Fox, 373
S.E.2d at 375) (“Negligence is not actionable unless there is a legal duty, a violation of the duty,
and consequent damage.”); Klingbeil Mgmt. Grp. v. Vito, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Va. 1987) (noting
that unless there is a special relationship which establishes a right of protection, there is no duty to
control a third person’s conduct); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va. 1974)
(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 to highlight that a special relationship will
give rise to a right of protection from the harmful conduct of a third person).
26. See 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.4.1 (“An essential characteristic of a ‘special relationship’
is that it provides a right of protection to a plaintiff by a defendant from the criminal acts of third
persons that can be reasonably foreseen or anticipated.”). See Burdette 421 S.E.2d at 420 (citing
Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904) (explaining that in Virginia a person is not typically held liable for
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this general rule will not apply if a special relationship exists between the two
parties. 27
To determine if a special relationship exists, one must establish that the acts
of the third person were reasonably foreseeable or anticipated by the
defendant. 28 A defendant’s duty to protect a plaintiff exists only if the defendant
knew of or could have reasonably foreseen the danger of injury to the plaintiff
from a third person’s conduct. 29 Also, a special relationship arises when a
defendant assumes charge or care over a third person, 30 who then harms another
person, who is a member of a class within the “area of danger.” 31 In determining
whether a defendant is liable for a third person’s conduct, the Virginia courts
explore what constitutes “taking charge” over a person. 32 Generally, “an express
or implied assumption of responsibility for the custody and control, and
therefore the conduct, of the person in question,” must occur. 33
Even in the absence of a special relationship, a defendant can still be held
liable if he takes affirmative action to assume a duty to act. 34 This action can

the criminal acts of a third person because “acts of assaultive criminal behavior . . . cannot
reasonably be foreseen”).
27. See Burns, 639 S.E.2d at 278 (quoting Burdette, 421 S.E.2d at 420); Didato v. Strehler,
554 S.E.2d 42, 49 (Va. 2001). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 315 (1965); 1 FRIEND,
supra note 4, § 2.6.
28. See Holles v. Sunrise Terrace, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 494, 498 (Va. 1999) (citing Klingbeil
Mgmt. Grp., 357 S.E.2d at 201; Gulf Reston, Inc., 207 S.E.2d at 844); Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904.
29. See A.H. v. Rockingham Publ’g Co., 495 S.E.2d 482, 485–86 (Va. 1998) (ruling a
newspaper publisher could not reasonably have foreseen that a newspaper carrier was in danger of
sexual assault on his particular route); see also 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.6.
30. See Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319
(1965)); Fox, 372 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 cmt. c) (noting
that a parole officer’s duty to supervise and assist does not put the parolee under care and control
of the parole officer).
31. Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 401 S.E.2d 878, 883 (Va. 1991)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 281(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the
plaintiff is outside the area of danger, the duty of care will not exist. Id. (determining the area based
upon the escaped parolee’s travel during his time outside of prison).
32. 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Fox, 372
S.E.2d at 376 (ruling parole officers did not necessarily take control of parolees because they kept
parolees in their custody and the parolees were free to operate their daily lives).
33. 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.6.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things,
is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable
care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by
the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other
or the third person upon the undertaking.
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appear in the form of a contract or an action to assist a person in danger. 35
However, because “no common law duty to assist another in peril” exists, an
actor who decides to assist another may be protected from liability “under a
state’s Good Samaritan Statute.” 36
B. Providing an Environment Conducive to Learning: The Principal’s Duty
Liability may be established by a school official’s action or inaction if he or
she “fail[s] to exercise ordinary care in supervising students,” and such behavior
“is the proximate cause of a student’s injury.” 37 Liability is often premised on
a state’s compulsory education laws 38 and the resultant role to protect the student
that the school assumes. 39
Id. See Kellermann v. McDonough, 684 S.E.2d 786, 791 (Va. 2009) (quoting Didato v. Strehler,
554 S.E.2d 42, 48 (Va. 2001)) (declaring that a mother who promised to take care of another
woman’s daughter had voluntarily assumed a duty to take reasonable care of the daughter).
35. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321–324A (1965) (laying out various
ways in which people can assume duties of care to third persons, including taking charge of a
helpless person or behaving in a manor that increases risk of harm to that person). See generally
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at 378–82 (5th ed.
1984) (providing the history and development of the rule).
36. 13 PETER N. SWISHER, ROBERT E. DRAIM, & DAVID D. HUDGINS, VIRGINIA PRACTICE
SERIES: TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 3:10 (2014 ed. 2014). Virginia’s Good Samaritan
Statute can be found in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (West 2014), which provides, in short, that a
person who acts in good faith to aid another in peril “shall not be liable for any civil damages for
acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such care or assistance.” Id. See Wheatley v.
United States, No. 98-2658, 1999 WL 1080121, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 1999) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision) (noting that if the “Good Samaritan” creates the emergency through
his actions or inactions, § 8.01-225 will not apply); Harrison v. Prince William Cnty. Police Dep’t,
640 F. Supp. 2d 688, 713 (E.D. Va. 2009) (stating that the Good Samaritan Act will not apply if
the actor acted in bad faith); Bowen v. Scott Cnty. Lifesaving & First Aid Crew, Inc., No. CL960119, 1997 WL 33121853, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1997) (discussing § 8.01-225 in relation to
emergency medical technicians and stating that “the statute shields the [actor] from any civil
damages without restriction as to the seriousness of the wrongful act”).
37. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 506 (West 2014). See also Edson v. Barre
Supervisory Union No. 61, 933 A.2d 200, 161 (Vt. 2007) (restricting the duty to one of prevention
of reasonable and foreseeable harm).
38. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1,
I (LexisNexis 1994)) (noting that “the compulsory character of school attendance” represents one
of the major factors considered in declaring “that a special relationship exists between schools and
students”).
39. See Williams v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Ky. 2003) (citing Yanero v.
Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 529 (Ky. 2001) (holding school officials liable for damages sustained by
students in a drunk driving accident after leaving a school); Lunsford v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince
George’s Cnty., 374 A.2d 1162, 1168 (Md. 1977) (recognizing that a school’s duty could be
analogous to a parent’s duty). This role arises from the school standing in place of the parent while
a student is in the charge of the school. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 328 (West Group
2000). See also Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 168 Cal. App. 4th 1320, 1327-28 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (finding that a school violated a duty of ordinary care to protect a student molested
by another student on school property); McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360,
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In the Virginia school system, the principal has a duty to “provide
instructional leadership,” as well as manage the administration and “operation .
. . of the school . . . and [its] property.” 40 Virginia children are required to attend
school, 41 and school officials have the responsibility of providing students with
“a safe, nondisruptive environment for effective teaching and learning.” 42 Thus,
a principal has a duty to supervise and care for a student and may be held liable
for harm if he fails to carry out these duties in the manner of a reasonably prudent
person under similar circumstances. 43
C. Establishing the Special Relationship
The Restatement (Second) of Torts 44 lists four commonly accepted special
relationships that give rise to a duty of reasonable care: “[a] carrier [and] its
passenger[,] . . . [a]n innkeeper [and] his guests,” a landowner and his invitee,
and a bailee and bailor.” 45 According to the drafters of the Restatement, the list
is not “exclusive” and other circumstances may create similar special
relationships. 46 Those relationships that have been rejected in some states
include: landlords and tenants, 47 a gun manufacturer and the victim of criminal
362 (Wash. 1953) (en banc) (“[T]he protective custody of teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parent.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. b (1965).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-293(B) (West 2014). A principal’s duties are set by the rules and
regulations of the school board and are supervised by the division superintendent. Id. at (A).
41. Virginia’s compulsory education law states:
[E]very parent, guardian, or other person in the Commonwealth having control or charge
of any child who will have reached the fifth birthday on or before September 30 of any
school year and who has not passed the eighteenth birthday shall, during the period of
each year the public schools are in session and for the same number of days and hours
per day as the public schools, send such child to a public school or to a private,
denominational, or parochial school or have such child taught by a tutor or teacher of
qualifications prescribed by the Board of Education and approved by the division
superintendent, or provide for home instruction of such child . . . .
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254(A).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6(B); See Brief In Opposition and In Support of Assignments
of Cross-Error of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Gregory Joseph Gagnon at 4, Burns v. Gagnon, 727
S.E.2d 634 (Va. 2012) (No. 110754), 2011 WL 9694387, at *4 (asserting that a school administrator
has a responsibility to ensure that students “could . . . have an education in an atmosphere conducive
to learning free of disruption and threat to person” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6(B) (pointing out the school district’s agreement to
assume care of the child); Kellermann v. McDonough, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (Va. 2009) (holding
that an adult must act with reasonable care when performing the duty to supervise and care for a
child granted to him or her by the parent).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
45. Id. Comment a adds an employer and his employee as another example. Id. at cmt. a.
46. Id. at cmt. b.
47. See Klingbeil Mgmt. Grp. v. Vito, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Va. 1987) (citing Gulf Reston,
Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va. 1974)) (finding a landlord not responsible for a tenant’s
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misuse of that gun, 48 a scouting organization and a scout, 49 a school and a
student injured at a time when the school did not have charge over him, 50 and a
social host and a guest. 51
1. Virginia and Special Relationships in Tort Liability
The Virginia courts have hesitated to recognize special relationships for third
person tort liability. 52 The Supreme Court of Virginia’s 1988 decision in Fox v.
Custis 53 articulated the factors that the court considers when determining
whether or not a special relationship exists. 54 The court found that no special
relationship existed between a corrections department and parties injured by a
parolee in its system because the injured plaintiffs “were simply members of the
general public, living in the free society, and having no special custodial or other
relationship with the state.” 55 Further, the court noted that the corrections
department never took charge or exercised control over the parolee, but, rather,
it operated as a supervisor and assistant in the parole process. 56
rape committed by a third person who had entered her apartment). But see Miller v. Whitworth,
455 S.E.2d 821, 827 (W. Va. 1995) (noting that circumstances do exist which would give rise to a
duty to protect a tenant from harm from a third person when the “landlord’s affirmative actions or
omissions” create the risk of injury).
48. See Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. 1989) (reasoning that gun
manufacturers have no method of controlling or screening who receives the gun).
49. See Doe v. Goff, 716 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that no special
relationship existed because the molestation of the scout by a volunteer was not foreseeable).
50. See Martin v. Twin Falls Sch. Dist. No. 411, 59 P.3d 317, 318, 321 (Idaho 2002) (holding
that because the students were two blocks from the school, and therefore out of the school’s
custody, the school district did not have a duty to protect the students from third-party harm). See
also Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, 1233–34 (Utah 2002) (ruling that the school
had no common law duty to the student because he had been discharged to his parent’s care and
was not participating in an extracurricular activity).
51. See Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P.2d 305, 310–11 (Utah 2000) (holding no duty is imposed
on a social host to protect or control guests when one guest has threatened to injure another).
52. See Kellermann v. McDonough, 684 S.E.2d 786, 793 (Va. 2009); Marshall v. Winston,
389 S.E.2d 902, 904–05 (Va. 1990); Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Va. 1988).
53. 372 S.E.2d 373 (Va. 1988). Fox involved a mentally unstable parolee who committed
fraud, drank alcohol, and exhibited inappropriate sexual behavior towards women while on parole.
Id. at 374. Despite these parole violations, the corrections department parole officer suggested that
the parolee remain on parole. Id. Shortly after, the parolee intentionally set fire to a home, attacked
and set fire to a woman, and subsequently attacked another female. Id.
54. Id. at 375–77.
55. Id. at 376 (quoting Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
56. Id. Under the statute, a parole officer “must [s]upervise and assist all person within his
territory released on parole.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-145(3)
(West 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d
410, 414–15 (S.D. 1987) (holding that a parole officer was not liable for the abduction, rape, and
murder of the victim because his required bimonthly visits did not constitute control over the
parolee who committed the crime); Lamb v. Hopkins, 492 A.2d 1297, 1302 (Md. 1985) (finding
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Two years later, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Marshall v. Winston 57
and once again declined to recognize a special relationship. 58 The court
considered whether or not “a sheriff and a jailer owed a special duty of care to
protect a member of the general public from harm by a third person.” 59 In
determining the existence of this duty, the court looked to Restatement (Second)
Torts §§ 315(a) and 319. 60 Read together, these sections of the Restatement
indicate that a special relationship will be recognized only when a third person,
who the defendant has “take[n] charge” 61 over, and who the defendant “kn[e]w
or should [have] know[n] [could] . . . cause bodily harm to others,” 62 causes such
injury to another. 63 The court held that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient
facts to prove that the defendants should have anticipated such harm and noted
that the sheriff and jailor defendants could not have foreseen that the man they
released would cause bodily harm to others. 64
In a 2009 case, Kellermann v. McDonough, 65 the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether an adult couple that agreed to watch over and care for
another’s child owed the child a duty to act with reasonable care and

that a probation officer did not have a duty to the parents of a child injured in a car accident because
he did not “tak[e] charge of the probationer”).
57. 389 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 1990).
58. Id. at 905.
59. Id. at 903. This case arose from the murder committed by a man who was out of prison
illegally after being released by the defendants. Id. The plaintiff brought this action claiming
negligence and violation of her decedent’s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 14th Amendment.
Id. at 904.
60. Id.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
62. Id.
63. See id. §§ 315(a), 319. Section 315(a) states that the duty to control a third person’s
conduct so as to prevent injury to another person does not exist unless “a special relation exists
between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third
person’s conduct.” Id. § 315(a). Section 319 provides that a person who does take charge of a third
person is “under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person” to stop him from
harming another when that person “knows or should [have] know[n]” that the third person would
“be likely to cause bodily harm to others.” Id. § 319. See Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 505–
06 (Va. 1995) (holding that a special relationship could not be based on a doctor-patient or hospitalpatient relationship alone, but that the plaintiff needed to present facts sufficient to show the
defendant’s control or charge over the third person within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 319). See also Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 523 S.E.2d 826, 830–32 (Va.
2000) (holding that a special relationship existed between a psychiatric hospital and its patient
because the psychiatric hospital had taken charge of the third person-patient who injured the
plaintiff and the hospital knew she was at high risk of hurting others and was in need of 24-hour
care).
64. Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 904–05. The court further noted that the decedent was not a
member of an identifiable group, but rather only a member of the general public, and thus was not
“owed a duty distinguishable from the duty [the sheriff] owed to the citizenry at large.” Id. at 905.
65. 684 S.E.2d 786 (Va. 2009).
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supervision. 66 The court decided that “when a parent relinquishes the
supervision and care of a child to an adult who agrees to supervise and care for
that child, the supervising adult must discharge that duty with reasonable
care.” 67 When confronted with the possibility of finding a special relationship,
the court again declined to extend the label to adults who agree to care for and
supervise a minor. 68
2. Special Relationships Established by the Virginia Court
Despite Virginia’s general refusal to acknowledge or establish special
relationships, Virginia courts recognize that some circumstances permit a
“special” designation. 69 The first of these circumstances comes from a 1992
Supreme Court of Virginia case, Burdette v. Marks, 70 which recognized a special
relationship between a sheriff deputy and a motorist. 71 In Burdette, the
defendant sheriff deputy, who was at the scene of a traffic accident, did not act
to protect the plaintiff as he was being attacked by a third person. 72 Despite the
defendant’s ability to see the plaintiff’s distress and serious injuries, the sheriff

66. Id. at 788. An adult couple allowed a minor child, whom they had agreed to take care of,
to get in the car with a known reckless, teenage male driver. Id. at 789. The parents of the minor
child had explicitly stated that their daughter was not allowed in a car driven by any inexperienced
drivers, especially males. Id. While in the car, the child became nervous and uncomfortable by the
teen boy’s speed and texted her dad and another friend that she feared for her life. Id. Shortly after,
the male driver lost control of the car and the back passenger side where the minor was sitting
swerved into a tree. Id. The minor died the next day as a result of the accident. Id.
67. Id. at 790. The court noted that this duty does not make the supervisor, in this case an
adult couple, the “insurer of the child’s safety,” but imposes the duty to act as a “reasonably prudent
person” would. Id. The “reasonably prudent person,” also known as the “ordinary prudent person,”
is “a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury’s social
judgment.” 1 FRIEND, supra note 4, § 2.2.1(A) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra, note 35, § 32, at
175). The court’s finding in Kellermann is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. See e.g.,
Putney v. Keith, 98 Ill. App. 285, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1901) (addressing the level of care owed to a
child compared to that of an adult, the court stated that “ordinary care as respects adults, may not
be as regards children; nevertheless, as regards children as well as adults, the care of persons having
no special relation to them, required by law, is that which prudent people exercise under like
circumstances”); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. 1965) (finding the defendants liable
for an infant’s injury because “[t]hey were required to use reasonable care to protect the infant
plaintiff from injury”).
68. Kellermann, 684 S.E.2d at 793. The court thereafter looked to see if proximate cause was
established to hold the supervising adults liable under the existence of an assumed duty or a duty
of ordinary care. Id.
69. See Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 434 (Va. 2006); Burdette v. Marks, 421
S.E.2d 419, 421 (Va. 1992).
70. 421 S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1992).
71. Id. at 419–21.
72. Id. at 419–20.
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deputy ignored the cries of help and did not render any assistance. 73 The court
noted that in order to hold the defendant liable for plaintiff’s injuries inflicted by
a third person, the plaintiff must establish that there was a special relationship
giving rise to such a duty. 74 The court then focused on whether or not the
defendant could have foreseen that he would be expected to take action. 75 The
court found that the sheriff should have known that he would be expected to act
because he was an on duty, uniformed officer, with the ability to protect the
plaintiff without severe injury to himself. 76 Therefore, the court held that “a
special relationship existed . . . which imposed a duty upon [the sheriff deputy]
to render assistance to [the plaintiff].” 77
The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized another special relationship in a
2006 case, Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc. 78 Taboada involved an attack by a third
person on a guest at a Holiday Inn Express. 79 Many factors were considered in
the court’s decision to find that a special relationship existed between the hotel
employee-defendant and the hotel guest-plaintiff. 80 The court first noted a deeprooted recognition in common law of a special relationship between an
innkeeper and his guests. 81 The court then went on to state that even though a
special relationship existed, “there [was] no liability when the defendant neither
kn[ew] of the danger of an injury to a plaintiff from the criminal conduct of a
third party nor ha[d] reason to foresee that danger.” 82 In Taboada, however, it
was clearly established that the defendant could have foreseen the injury because
he had been “advised by police that ‘[the hotel’s] guests were at a specific
imminent risk for harm to their persons from uninvited persons coming into or
73. Id. at 420 (pointing out that the defendant personally knew both the plaintiff and the
attacker, and knew the third-party’s disposition to violent behavior).
74. Id. at 420–21. See Marshall v. Winston, 389 S.E.2d 902, 905 (Va. 1990); Fox v. Custis,
372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (Va. 1988); Klingbeil Mgmt. Grp. v. Vito, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Va. 1987).
75. Burdette, 421 S.E.2d at 421. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
76. Burdette, 421 S.E.2d at 421 (finding the defendant’s weapon and training indicative of
his ability to avoid substantial injury). The court noted that the plaintiff even asked for help from
defendant. Id.
77. Id. The court noted that the case was not about the “special relation between the defendant
and the third party . . . because the defendant was not charged with the custody or control of the
third party.” Id. at 421 n.2.
78. 626 S.E.2d 428 (Va. 2006).
79. Id. at 430. The plaintiff was mugged and shot, sustaining severe bodily injury, while in
the parking lot of the defendant’s hotel. Id.
80. Id. at 431–32. The court noted that, in light of the narrow exception to the general rule
for liability of injuries caused by a third-party, the application of the exception “is always fact
specific and, thus, not amenable to a bright-line rule for resolution.” Id. (quoting Yuzefovsky v.
St. John’s Wood Apartments, 540 S.E.2d 134, 139 (Va. 2001)).
81. Id. at 432 (citations omitted) (citing Yuzefovsky, 540 S.E.2d at 140). See e.g., Holles v.
Sunrise Terrace, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 494, 497–98 (Va. 1990) (declining to extend the innkeeper-guest
relationship to a grounds manager).
82. Taboada, 626 S.E.2d at 433.

220

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:209

upon its property.’” 83 As such, the court found that the defendant could have
reasonably foreseen an attack on the plaintiff, who was a guest. 84
D. Exploring a New Kind of Relationship in the School
Although Virginia has not recognized the existence of a special relationship
between school officials and students, 85 some jurisdictions outside of Virginia
have accepted the school-student special relationship. 86
In 1995, New Hampshire embraced a special relationship between one
school’s officials and the school’s students in Marquay v. Eno. 87 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that “schools share a special relationship with
students entrusted to their care, which imposes upon them certain duties of
reasonable supervision.” 88 The court based the scope of that duty on
foreseeability. 89 When determining the existence of a special relationship, the
court considered many factors, including compulsory education requirements,
parents’ expectations of a safe school environment for students, and society’s
interest in schools providing education to students. 90
The court clarified that the “duty falls upon those school employees who have
supervisory responsibility over students,” but that the “duty is limited to those
83. Id. at 435. The court also took into consideration that the defendant’s staff had called the
police ninety-six times within a three-year period, reporting “robberies, malicious woundings,
shootings and other criminally assaultive acts.” Id.
84. Id. (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim based on negligence).
85. See Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 643 (Va. 2012) (noting that no case exists
establishing a principal-student relationship in the common law or in the Virginia court). But see
Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002) (applying Virginia law
and holding that a college and its students shared a special relationship after the college required a
student to sign a statement promising not to harm himself and he later committed suicide).
86. See e.g., J. H. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182, 193–97 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010) (exploring the case law on special relationships between schools and students and finding
that one exists where the lack of ordinary care may be the proximate cause of a child’s injury); M.
W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“A
special relationship is formed between a school district and its students resulting in the imposition
of an affirmative duty on the school district to take all reasonable steps to protect its students.”);
Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (finding that a special relationship stems from the
students’ separation from their parents, and the students’ diminished abilities to protect themselves
while in school, while also highlighting that principals will only have a duty to protect a student if
there is a known or reasonably foreseeable threat to a particular student).
87. Marquay, 662 A.2d at 280. The plaintiffs in Marquay were three female former students
in the Mascoma Valley Regional School District. Id. at 275. The plaintiffs each “allege[d] that she
was exploited, harassed, assaulted, and sexually abused by one or more employees of the school
district.” Id. The complaints further “allege[d] that . . . school employees . . . were aware or should
have been aware of the sexual abuse[s]” that occurred. Id.
88. Id. at 279.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. 193:1, I (LexisNexis 1994)).
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periods when parental protection is compromised.” 91 The court noted that,
although the principal and superintendent were not always the primary
supervisors, they were still “charged with overseeing all aspects of the school’s
operation” and, therefore, owed a duty of ordinary care to a student when a
known or reasonably ascertainable threat to the student arises. 92
In California, a special relationship between a school and its students has also
been recognized. In M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School District, 93 the
California Court of Appeals held a school district liable for the sexual assault of
an intellectually disabled student. 94 The court acknowledged that “[a] special
relationship is formed between a school district and its students [that] result[s]
in the imposition of an affirmative duty on the school district to take all
reasonable steps to protect its students.” 95
Similar to New Hampshire, California schools aim to provide students with
an environment conducive to their education and well-being. 96 Therefore,
California holds school districts responsible for a student’s injuries if a school

91. Marquay, 662 A.2d at 279.
92. Id. at 280. Not all school employees “shoulder[] a personal duty simply by virtue of
receiving a paycheck from the school district.” Id. at 279. Rather, the court placed the “duty . . .
upon . . . school employees who have supervisory responsibility over students and who thus have
stepped into the role of parental proxy.” Id. When an employee that meets this relationship
“acquire[s] actual knowledge of abuse or . . . learn[s] of facts [that] would lead a reasonable person
to conclude a student is being abused[,]” the employee may be liable if his or her unreasonable
supervision was a proximate cause to the student’s injury. Id.
93. 110 Cal. App. 4th 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
94. Id. at 520–21. The plaintiff in this case was a fifteen-year-old student enrolled in special
education classes at Earl Warren Junior High School. Id. at 512–13. The school provided “general”
supervision to students who arrived on campus between 7:00 and 7:45 a.m., which gave “every
adult on campus . . . the broad responsibility of supervising the students.” Id. at 512 (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, no adults were specifically assigned locations to monitor and
“[n]o one maintained visual contact over the students who arrived early.” Id. Even areas marked
as “trouble spots”—because they were not easy to see—were not monitored consistently. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff was among the few students who arrived early to
school, and he “generally stayed near the school office.” Id. at 513. On the morning of May 21,
1997, another special education student, who had multiple disciplinary infractions, tricked the
plaintiff into going to the boy’s restroom where he sodomized the plaintiff. Id. at 513–14. The
same student had sexually assaulted the plaintiff previously that same year, but the plaintiff had
been too afraid to report the incident. Id. at 514. The plaintiff sued the school district after the
second incident, and the trial court returned a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 515–16.
95. Id. at 517. The California court recognized this affirmative duty in part because of the
state’s compulsory education law. See Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist., 186 Cal. App.
3d 707, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(1) (West, Westlaw through
November 2008 amendments); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2014) (mandating full-time
education for children between the ages of six and eighteen)).
96. M. W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 517 (quoting In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1295 (en banc)
(Cal. 1985)) (“Teaching and learning cannot take place without the physical and mental well-being
of the students. The school premises, in short, must be safe and welcoming.”).

222

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:209

official’s failure to act with ordinary care caused the injuries. 97 This standard of
care is defined by the behavior of a reasonably prudent person “under the same
circumstances” and can be breached by either “a total lack of supervision or
ineffective supervision.” 98 However, as other cases have noted, liability will not
be established unless the harm to the student was foreseeable. 99
The court in M. W. held that it was “reasonably foreseeable that . . . the lack
of direct supervision in the early morning hours” could lead to a “risk for a sexual
or other physical assault” on a student. 100 It recognized that a special
relationship existed between the school and the student and noted that school
districts have a “minimal burden . . . to ensure adequate supervision for any
students they permit on their campuses.” 101
State courts are not the only ones to recognize the school-student special
relationship. In 2012, the Restatement (Third) of Torts took the step of adding
“a school with its students” to the list of recognized special relationships. 102 The
addition, one of three new additions, was in response to the relationship’s
“substantial acceptance among courts.” 103
II. BURNS V. GAGNON: EXAMINING THE DUTY OWED BY A VICE PRINCIPAL TO
HIS STUDENTS
Virginia has taken a different view on school liability, as evidenced by the
state’s Supreme Court decision in Burns v. Gagnon. 104
A. The Report of a Potential Fight Set Aside for a Later Time
On the morning of December 14, 2006, high school student Shannon H. Diaz
was called into the principal’s office to discuss a prior disciplinary offense. 105
After Diaz had a discussion with Principal Layton H. Beverage and Vice
Principal W.R. Travis Burns, the meeting between the three concluded. 106 Diaz
97. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 110 P.2d 1044, 1048
(Cal. 1941)); see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807.
98. Id. at 518 (citations omitted) (quoting Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 470 P.2d 360,
363 (1970) (en banc)).
99. See id. (quoting Taylor, 110 P.2d at 1048) (citing Leger, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 694). See also
Leger, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 694 (holding that the risk of attack on a student in an unsupervised locker
room is reasonably foreseeable to school officials because school officials must act on threats of
violence). Foreseeability focuses on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the negligent
conduct would result in a “particular kind of harm.” Id. (quoting Weiner v. Southcoast Childcare
Ctrs., Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 883, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. M. W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 520.
101. Id. at 521.
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40(b)(5) (2012).
103. Id. at cmt. l.
104. 727 S.E.2d 634, 643 (Va. 2012).
105. Id. at 639.
106. Id.
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then informed Burns about a fight allegedly going to take place between two
students. 107 Diaz stated that his information was based on online conversations
via MySpace and that the student “Gregory J. Gagnon was going to get into a
fight with another student sometime that day.” 108
Diaz could not provide Burns with the name of the second student, or identify
a time or place that the fight would occur other than at some time that day. 109
Burns assured Diaz that security would be informed, and the problem
resolved. 110 About two hours later, the fight occurred without Burns ever having
related Diaz’s information to anyone. 111
B. Injury and a Lawsuit: The Results of Peer-on-Peer Violence
Before the incident, James S. Newsome, Jr., and his sister Christine D.
Newsome had approached Gagnon and “exchanged words” before Christine
encouraged her brother to “either . . . hit Gagnon or walk away.” 112 James
Newsome hit Gagnon in the face one time, “knocking [Gagnon’s] head back into
a brick pillar.” 113 Gagnon suffered permanent brain damage from the blow, and,
subsequently, filed a complaint alleging negligence, assault, and battery. 114
In his claim against Vice Principal Burns, Gagnon alleged simple and gross
negligence based on Burns’ legal breaches of duties owed to him, including “(1)
failing to implement necessary policies and procedures to ‘rein[] [in] studenton-student fights’ at the school; (2) taking no action in response to Diaz’ report;
and (3) failing to protect him from Newsome’s conduct.” 115 Gagnon further
sought joint and several liability of all defendants for “present and future brain
injury” suffered as a result of their “intentional and negligent acts.” 116 In
response, Burns argued that he did not owe a legal duty to Gagnon and, even if
he did, both Virginia’s statutes and common law provided him with immunity
from a gross negligence claim. 117
107. Id.
108. Id. at 639.
109. Id. at 646.
110. Id. at 639.
111. Id.
112. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. Gagnon brought assault and battery claims against Newsome and an aiding and
abetting assault and battery claim against Christine. Id. The negligence claim brought against
Burns asserted breaches of various duties of care. Id.
115. Id. (alteration in original).
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1:2(A) (West 2014) (providing immunity to teachers
for actions done in good faith). See also Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 601 S.E.2d 591, 593 n.4 (Va.
2004) (citing James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 684, 869 (Va. 1980); Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657,
663 (Va. 1984)) (enumerating the four-factor test for determining if an individual is entitled to
sovereign immunity).
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The trial court concluded that Burns owed a legal duty to Gagnon and that he
was not entitled to statutory or common law sovereign immunity. 118 The court
further concluded that Burns’ actions did not amount to gross negligence and
refused to instruct the jury on the issue. 119 At the end of the nine-day trial, the
jury returned a verdict against the defendants and awarded Gagnon five million
dollars in damages. 120
C. A Question of First Impression
Both Burns and Gagnon appealed the circuit court’s decision. 121 Burns
challenged the finding that he had a legal duty to protect Gagnon and the court’s
denial of sovereign immunity. 122 On cross-appeal, Gagnon challenged the
court’s refusal to instruct the jury on gross negligence. 123 Thus, the Supreme
Court of Virginia began its opinion with a discussion of legal duty, addressing
the elevated duty of care, the common law duty of ordinary care, and the
assumed duty to investigate and notify. 124
1. Elevated Duty of Care
In assessing whether Burns owed Gagnon a heightened duty of care, the
Supreme Court of Virginia faced a matter of first impression: “[w]hether a
special relationship exists between a principal and a student.” 125 The court noted
the importance of distinguishing between an “official’s public duty owed to the
citizenry at large,” and, if one exists, their “special duty owed to a specific,
identifiable person or class of persons.” 126 According to the court, an official
can only be held liable in a negligence claim if a special duty exists. 127

118. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 640. The circuit court did not specify what “legal duties” Burns
owed Gagnon. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Burns was not granted immunity because
the court ruled that his actions were ministerial rather than discretionary. Id. (citing B.M.H. v. Sch.
Bd. of City of Chesapeake, 883 F. Supp. 560, 571 (E.D. Va. 1993)).
119. Id. at 640–41. Gagnon had requested that an instruction on gross negligence be given to
the jury, but the court did not find that Gagnon had stated the facts necessary to set out a case of
gross negligence. Id.
120. Id. at 641.
121. Id. at 639.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 641.
124. Id. at 641–43.
125. Id. at 642.
126. Id. (quoting Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Va. 1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
127. Id. (quoting Burdette, 421 S.E.2d at 421) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining
that it would not be in “society’s best interest” to hold a public official liable for acts resulting from
a public duty, because it puts the official in a situation of “potential liability for every action
undertaken” (quoting Burdette, 421 S.E.2d. at 421) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The court first looked at whether or not Burns “reasonably could have
foreseen that he would be expected to take affirmative action to protect [Gagnon]
from harm.” 128 The court reasoned that because Burns only had the name of one
student who would be in the fight, and had no facts regarding the fight’s time or
location, the case could be distinguished from Burdette. 129
In Burdette, the deputy sheriff witnessed an attack on a motorist after arriving
at the scene of a car crash, but did nothing to stop the attack. 130 The facts
established that the sheriff “knew or should have known that Burdette was in
great danger of serious bodily injury or death.” 131 The court distinguished the
facts in Burns from those in Burdette based on Burns’ partial knowledge about
the potential fight, which limited his ability to foresee that Gagnon “was in great
danger of serious bodily injury or death.” 132 Also, unlike the sheriff, Burns was
not present at the fight to “step in and stop” it. 133
The court next distinguished Burns from Taboada, which Gagnon had used to
support his argument. 134 Taboada held that an innkeeper had a special
relationship with his guest by relying on the medieval notion that “a host owed
to his guest the duty, not only of hospitality, but also of protection.” 135 Gagnon
argued that a school principal was entrusted not only with the students’ safety,
but also charged with ensuring that the school was a safe environment, similar
to an innkeeper’s responsibility for ensuring his guests’ safety. 136
The court rejected Gagnon’s argument for an analogous special relationship
between a principal and his students for two reasons. 137 First, there was no
“deep-rooted” history of a principal-student relationship in common law,
whereas the history of the innkeeper-guest relationship “dates back to the Middle
Ages.” 138 Second, burdening a public official with potential liability for all acts
performed in his official capacity would contradict society’s best interest. 139

128. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burdette, 421 S.E.2d. at 421) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
129. Id. (citing Burdette, 421 S.E.2d. at 421).
130. Burdette, 421 S.E.2d at 420.
131. Id. at 421.
132. Id.
133. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 642.
134. Id.
135. Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 432 n.4 (Va. 2006) (quoting Kveragas v.
Scottish Inns, Inc., 733 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1984)) (recognizing the deep rooted history of the
innkeeper-guest relationship).
136. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 642. Gagnon also argued that “the student, like the guest, has little
ability to control his environment and thus relies on the principal to make the school safe, just as
the guest relies on the innkeeper to make the inn safe.” Id. at 643.
137. Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
138. Id. The court also noted that Gagnon himself could not point to any such history. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Va. 1992)).
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2. The Common Law Duty of Ordinary Care
After deciding that no special relationship existed between Burns and Gagnon,
the Supreme Court of Virginia next addressed whether Burns owed Gagnon a
common law duty of ordinary care. 140 The court relied on its 2009 decision
in Kellermann v. McDonough to determine that Burns actually owed Gagnon a
common law duty of care. 141 Kellermann established that an adult who agreed
to supervise another adult’s child must exercise reasonable care when carrying
out that duty. 142 The court was careful to note, however, that the agreement to
supervise a child does not mean that the supervisor absolutely becomes the
“insurer of the child’s safety.” 143 Rather, it means that he needed to “discharge
his . . . duties as a reasonably prudent person would under similar
circumstances.” 144
Comparing Kellerman and Burns, the court found that Burns owed Gagnon a
common law duty to supervise and care because Gagnon’s parents were required
by law to send Gagnon to school. 145 As vice principal, Burns was responsible
for supervising and ensuring a safe learning environment. 146 Consequently, the
court concluded, as it did in Kellermann, that Burns could be “liable if he failed
to ‘discharge his . . . duties as a reasonably prudent person would under similar
circumstances.’” 147
3. Assumed Duty to Investigate and Report
Finally, the court addressed whether Burns had an assumed duty to act based
on his conversation with Diaz, when he told Diaz he would inform security about
the fight. 148 Although the court briefly discussed the assumed duty to
investigate, it did not rule on the matter because neither party had raised the issue
in the court below. 149 However, the court stated that liability stemming from the

140. Id.
141. Id. “By law, Gagnon’s parents had to send Gagnon to school, where it was the
responsibility of Burns and other school officials to supervise and ensure that students could . . .
have an education in an atmosphere conducive to learning, free of disruption, and threat to person.”
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Kellermann v. Mcdonough, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (Va. 2009).
143. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting Kellermann, 684 S.E.2d at 790) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
144. Id. (quoting Kellermann, 684 S.E.2d at 790) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (West 2014).
146. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643.
147. Id. (quoting Kellermann, 684 S.E.2d. at 790). The Virginia Supreme Court refused to
answer whether or not Burns could be found liable. Id. at 644.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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assumption of a duty arises when a person does not perform his or her duties
with reasonable care and, as a result, harms a third party. 150
In addressing whether liability exists to that third party, the court referred to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. 151 This provision states that an
undertaker will be held liable to a third party when he should have recognized
that it was necessary for the safety and protection of the third person “to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable
care increases the risk of such harm, or . . . (c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.” 152
III. BALANCING INTERESTS: SAFE SCHOOLS VERSUS PROTECTED OFFICIALS
A. What the Burns Decision Says About the Virginia Supreme Court
Through its refusal to acknowledge a special relationship between a principal
and a student in Burns, 153 the Supreme Court of Virginia chose to protect
officials rather than students. The court reached this decision by balancing
Burns’ ability to foresee that harm would occur, 154 his ability to prevent the
fight, 155 the lack of both evidence and case law to support the establishment of
a special relationship between a principal and a student, and the impact a
principal-student special relationship would have on public officials. 156
1. Foreseeability
The foreseeability of a negligent action rests largely on the duty assumed and
the level of risk to the third party. 157 In its discussion, the court emphasized that
150. Id. at 643–44.
151. Id. at 644.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
153. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643 (holding that there are potentially detrimental public policy
implications that could stem from holding public officials liable for any and all actions).
154. Id. at 642 (quoting Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Va. 1992)).
155. Id. (pointing out the lack of information Burns had in regard to the fight).
156. Id. at 642–43.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (“An act or an omission may be negligent if
the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct
is criminal.”). The explanatory comments in the applicable Restatement section provide:
There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to
anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of others. In
general, these situations arise where the actor is under a special responsibility toward the
one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such intentional
misconduct; or where the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to
a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable
man would take into account. The following are examples of such situations. The list is
not an exclusive one, and there may be other situations in which the actor is required to
take precautions.
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Burns’ knowledge about the potential fight was insufficient to establish
foreseeability. 158 However, in California, the M. W. court satisfied the
foreseeability analysis in regard to student harm based solely on the fact that the
school district should have known that, without supervision, a student with an
intellectual disability would be at risk for assault in the early morning. 159
Therefore, the information that Burns had regarding the potential fight—
Gagnon’s involvement and that the fight would occur that day—should have
been sufficient to establish foreseeability. 160
Virginia law, according to Burns, suggests that a defendant must know all of
the parties involved in a potential fight, along with its specific time and place in
order to declare that he or she knew or should have known that the plaintiff was
in danger of harm. 161 This policy results in leniency towards the school officials,
and drastically reduces their responsibility for student safety, simply because the
officials do not have all the facts.
2. Ability to Prevent the Fight
The Burns court also discussed the issue of Burns’ absence from the fight and
his inability to prevent it. 162 The court reasoned that “Burns was not in a position
to step in and stop the fight,” 163 without considering the fact that Burns could
have stepped in before it even occurred. 164 In fact, Burns admitted that Diaz’s
A. Where, by contract or otherwise, the actor has undertaken a duty to protect the other
against such misconduct. Normally such a duty arises out of a contract between the
parties, in which such protection is an express or an implied term of the agreement.
Id. at cmt. e(A).
158. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 642.
159. M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 520 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
160. See Kimberly Miller, Note, Arkansas Civil Rights Act—School Districts’ Liability for
Peer Abuse: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds School Districts Have No Duty to Protect Students
from Each Other. Rudd v. Pulaski County Special School District, 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310
(2000), 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 977, 985–87 (2001). Not all states allow a tort suit to be
brought against a school district. Id. at 984. (pointing out that some states grant absolute immunity
to school districts). Those that do allow tort claims must show there was an affirmative duty of
protection owed to the student based on the school’s reasonable foreseeability that a person’s
“negligent act might injure the particular plaintiff.” Id. at 986. The Supreme Court of Washington
applied this idea, holding that a school district could have reasonably foreseen that an unlocked
room in the school gym could be used to “engage in sexual misconduct.” Id. at 986 (citing Mcleod
v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 363–65 (Wash. 1953) (en banc) (discussing
whether a rape was within a field of danger that a school district could have reasonably foreseen)).
161. See Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 642.
162. Id. (distinguishing Burns from the sheriff in Burdette v. Marks).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 640. A deputy assigned to the high school testified in regard to the fight that Burns
admitted that he had “screwed up.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) Further, Gagnon’s
parents testified that Burns had apologized to them for “dropp[ing] the ball.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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report of the fight presented a pressing matter and that “he could have located
Gagnon that morning . . . or asked one of the school’s security guards to remove
Gagnon from class, and could have had Gagnon brought to the office.” 165
However, rather than taking any of these actions, “Burns said that he had other
priorities to attend to that morning.” 166
Despite Burns’ absence from the fight, the court could have found that a fight,
especially when a student reports its likely occurrence, is not always a “random,
spontaneous act[].” 167 For example, courts in Arizona 168 , Maryland 169 , and
California 170 have all recognized a need for schools to protect their students
“when a school is aware of the likelihood of student injury.” 171 Courts that
recognize a duty to protect often analyze “the degree of certainty that injury will
occur, the specificity of notice to the school of the probable injury, the prior
occurrence of similar events, and the impact that action by the school would
have had on the likelihood of injury.” 172 The court in Burns could have applied
this analysis, which other states utilize, to examine a school’s duty to protect.
Under this analysis, Burns likely had breached this duty because: (1) injury was
likely to occur, (2) Burns was specifically informed of the name of a student to
be involved and the day it would occur, and (3) Burns’ failure to act increased
the likelihood that the fight would occur and a student would be injured. 173

165. Id. (referencing the school’s computer system that could have been used to find Gagnon’s
classroom schedule).
166. Id.
167. See Melissa L. Gilbert, Comment, “Time-Out” for Student Threats?: Imposing a Duty to
Protect on School Officials, 49 UCLA L. REV. 917, 922–23 (2002) (arguing that schools should not
be held responsible for random acts by students due to the lack of foreseeability).
168. See Jesik v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 611 P.2d 547, 551 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc)
(holding that where school personnel “had specific and repeated notice” of potential harm and the
person involved, there was a “specific duty to exercise reasonable care to protect” the student).
169. See Eisel v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 597 A.2d 447, 452–54 (Md. 1991)
(holding that the decedent’s suicide was foreseeable because the defendant-student counselors “had
direct evidence of [the student’s] intent to commit suicide”).
170. See Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(“[S]chool authorities who know of threats of violence that they believe are well-founded may not
refrain from taking reasonable preventive measures simply because violence has yet to occur.”).
171. See Gilbert, supra note 167, at 923.
172. Id. (footnotes omitted).
173. Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E. 2d 634, 639–40, 642 (Va. 2012) (listing the facts that Burns
knew about the pending fight). The court did not discuss any of the facts relating to whether
Gagnon had been in fights previously or if student fights were common at the school. Thus, prior
disciplinary infractions did not factor into the court’s analysis. But see Small v. McKennan Hosp.,
403 N.W.2d 410, 413 (S.D. 1987) (refusing to take into account prior issues with a hospital security
ramp when determining the hospital’s accountability for the kidnapping and murder of an employee
because “strict adherence to the ‘prior similar acts’ rule [was] unduly restrictive and place[d] too
great a burden on the plaintiff”).

230

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:209

3. The History of Special Relationships
Admittedly, the history of special relationships between principals and
students is not as “deep-rooted” as the innkeeper and guest special
relationship. 174 Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have not shied away from
upholding its existence. 175 The Virginia court’s easy dismissal of a special
relationship based on the lack of a “deep-rooted” history highlights Virginia’s
hostility towards recognizing new special relationships, even in the face of
obvious harm to the safety of children in schools. 176
Had the Supreme Court of Virginia been able to apply the Restatement (Third)
of Torts, rather than the Second, it would have found that section 40 specifically
recognizes the special relationship between a school and its students. 177
Unfortunately, the relevant section of the Restatement (Third) was not yet
published at the time of the Burns case. 178 The question now becomes: would
the Supreme Court of Virginia have decided differently if the Third
Restatement’s information had been available?

174. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643. See also Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 432
(Va. 2006).
175. See Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (citing Chavez v. Tolleson
Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that the duty of ordinary
care between students and teachers was established by statute); Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City
Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d 851, 853 (Cal. 1978) (declaring the duty of care between teachers and students
as a “uniform standard”); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 32 (D.C.1987); Pratt v.
Robinson, 349 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1976) (comparing the relationship between students and
teacher, only when teachers have control over the students, to the innkeeper-guest relationship);
Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1337 (en banc) (Or. 1987) (pointing to the
uniqueness of an educator’s role to find a special relationship requiring a heightened duty of care);
Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105–157–166J, 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1988) (en banc)
(recognizing a duty of ordinary care between coaches and student-athletes based on the supervisory
role taken on by the coach); McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362 (Wash.
1953) (en banc) (finding the basis for the duty of care a teacher owes a student in the statutory
requirement for children to attend school)).
176. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643.
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §40(b)(5) (2012) (stipulating that “a duty of reasonable
care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship” exist between “a school
[and] its students”); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Reshaping the Traditional Limits
of Affirmative Duties Under the Third Restatement of Torts, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 319, 325
(2011) (naming the new special relationship listed in the Restatement).
178. See Press Release, The American Law Institute, New Restatement on the Law of Torts
Published by The American Law Institute (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=news.prelease_11282012. (declaring the publication date of Third
Restatement of Torts as November 28, 2012). Burns was decided in April 2012. Burns, 727 S.E.2d
at 634.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia allowed its adherence to old law to dictate its
decision when it denied that Burns had a special relationship with Gagnon. 179
Although the court looked into many factors, it failed to adequately consider one
of the most important ones: school safety. 180
4. Society’s Best Interest
Lastly, the court in Burns used the public policy argument against special
relationships, holiding that “it [was] not in society’s best interest to subject
public officials to potential liability for every action undertaken.” 181 However,
the California court pointed out in M. W. that a special relationship puts only a
“minimal burden on school districts to ensure adequate supervision for any
students” at school. 182 The Virginia court, concerned with protecting officials,
failed to consider the appropriate quality of supervision that students deserve
and the best interest of the child. 183
179. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643 (noting Virginia’s long-standing reluctance to recognize special
relationships between students and school districts or officials). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§40(b)(5) (2012). Comment l provides that:
Despite the Second Restatement’s limited treatment of affirmative duties of schools, such
a duty has enjoyed substantial acceptance among courts since the Second Restatement’s
publication. As with the other duties imposed by this Section, it is only applicable to
risks that occur while the student is at school or otherwise engaged in school activities.
Id. at cmt. l.
180. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 642–43 (addressing the school’s overall safety only for purposes of
comparing to the innkeeper-guest relationship). The Virginia Supreme Court still stubbornly
refuses to hold schools accountable for third-party action. For example, on October 31, 2013, the
court held that the Commonwealth did not have a duty to protect the students on the Virginia Tech
campus from the “third party criminal acts” that resulted in the mass shooting on campus on April
16, 2007. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 (Va. 2013). The court reasoned that
the limited information provided to the Commonwealth (the shooter’s unknown identity, the beliefs
that the shooter had left campus, and that the first shooting was an isolated incident) could not have
lead it to reasonably foresee that the students in a particular hall would be victims of criminal harm.
Id. at 313. In its opinion, the court evaded the question of whether a special relationship existed by
“[a]ssuming without deciding that a special relationship existed.” Id. (emphasis added). Even so,
an assumed special relationship does not sufficiently establish liability without the foreseeability
element. Id.
181. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643 (Va. 2012) (quoting Burdette v. Marks, 421 S.E.2d 419, 421
(Va. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Virginia has referred to “the best interests of
society” as “the preservation of home and family, the foundation of all society.” Offield v. Davis,
40 S.E. 910, 913 (Va. 1902).
182. M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 521 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
183. Although the “best interest of the child” is not an easily defined term, one scholar notes
that in family law, “[t]hese interests may be different from those of the parent or the state.” Bridget
A. Blinn, Focusing on Children: Providing Counsel to Children in Expedited Proceedings to
Terminate Parental Rights, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 826 (2004). This scholar further states
that when parents are accused of abuse, one of the children’s interests includes “freedom from
severe physical abuse or impending death.” Id. Given that schools in Virginia have been said to
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Requiring a school official to act on reports of suspected acts of violence, and
therefore requiring the principal—or teacher, counselor, or other school
official—”to protect students from actual harm” creates a safer environment for
students. 184 This duty does not require the official to expend all possible avenues
to prevent the violence, but merely requires some action. 185 A quick call to
security, for example, could fulfill this duty. This requirement would likely lead
to an environment in which students may learn without the fear of violence. 186
B. Virginia’s Questionable Policy: Choosing to Protect Officials Over
Students
The role of the principal and the vice principal, in the Virginia school system
is to “provide instructional leadership[,] . . . be responsible for the administration
of” the school, and to “supervise the operation and management of the school or
schools and property to which he has been assigned.” 187 As vice principal, it
was also Burns’ responsibility to receive reports concerning disciplinary
offenses, a function placing him in a supervisory position. 188 This supervisory
position, which would establish a special relationship in California and New
Hampshire, is addressed under § 314A(4) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 189 According to the Restatement, a supervisory position is established
when “[o]ne who is requied by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody
of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal
opportunities for protection.” 190
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Burns addresses the burden on
public officials, but it does not take into account the needs of students and
teachers. 191 Had the court balanced the potential burden on public officials with

assume the role of parents, this interest may be imputed to school systems while students are under
their care. See Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (protecting a student’s interest to
safe schools and finding that “the duty falls upon those school employees . . . who thus have stepped
into the role of parental proxy”).
184. Alison Bethel, Note/Comment, Keeping Schools Safe: Why Schools Should Have an
Affirmative Duty to Protect Students from Harm by Other Students, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 183, 185
(2004).
185. Id.
186. See id. (citing JILL F. DEVOE ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2003
36 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004004.pdf).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-293(B) (1950). The school board sets a principal’s duties, with
supervision by the division superintendent. Id.
188. Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 639 (Va. 2012).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965).
190. Id.
191. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 634 (addressing the case law and comparable relationships that
constitute special relationships without reaching the needs of students in particular).
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the safety of the school, the court may have been more willing to accept a special
relationship for a vice principal and his students. 192
Violence in schools is a serious matter for both parents and society as a whole.
While the incident in Burns involved two students, there are other acts of
violence against teachers or administrators. 193 Where should the line be drawn
regarding what deserves attention and what does not? If a threat to school safety
must be looked into, should officials then be allowed to set aside a threat of a
potential fight between students because there are other matters they must attend
to first? However, an official must prioritize student safety on school grounds
with his or her other responsibilities because an official is rarely concerned with
school safety alone.
The problem that may emerge from the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision
in Burns is that school officials would not feel required to act. 194 Perhaps the
leniency that has been afforded to students has allowed them to believe that
violent behavior is inevitable; or maybe school officials are so concerned with a
school’s good reputation that they let small acts of violence fly under the
radar. 195 Whatever the reason, it is a matter that needs to be dealt with
appropriately. 196 A school official’s job dictates that he or she watch over
students and enforce the rules; students cannot be expected to discipline
themselves.
Virginia’s decision, however, grants officials a free pass to ignore the smaller
forms of violence. Admitting that a vice principal slacked in his duty and

192. See Bethel, supra note 184, at 201 (2004) (pointing out the duty that school officials
should be held accountable if he or she is “aware or should reasonably be aware[] that students are
harming other students”).
193. See e.g., Carolyn Thompson, Violence Against Teachers Often Ignored, Task Force Says,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/TheCulture/Family/2013/1118/Violence-against-teachers-often-ignored-task-force-says (finding that
almost half of teachers experience physical violence from students and recounting instances of
violence that led to teachers needing emergency care and years of therapy).
194. See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 185 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the dissenting judge’s “concern that failing to hold a school
accountable for violence done to students creates an incentive for school administrators to pursue
inaction when they are uniquely situated to prevent harm to their students”).
195. See Ben Axelson, Your Comments on School Violence Forum: ‘The Powers Can No
Longer Hide Their Heads in the Sand’, SYRACUSE.COM (Feb. 15, 2014, 4:40 PM),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2014/02/your_comments_on_school_violence_forum_t
he_powers_can_no_longer_hide_their_heads.html (quoting an anonymous teacher stating that
officials are reluctant to address violence because they do not want to have too many documented
incidents of violent student behavior).
196. Educating the nation’s youth is an important task that cannot be accomplished without
safe schools. See Andy McNeil, Officials Address Safety Concerns of Camden Students, COURIERPOST (Feb. 28, 2014, 12:18 AM), http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/2014/02/28/
Officials-address-safety-concerns-of-Camden-students/5876961 (noting that many students do not
feel safe at school and are therefore unable to focus in class).
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allowed a student to be severely injured would not have impacted the current
operation of many schools. It is an understandable concern that greater liability
for officials will be a burden; 197 concerns other than teenage squabbles may
surely take precedence at times. However, if officials are not held to a duty of
care sufficient to prompt them to act when potential violence is reported,
violence in schools will only grow worse.
IV. CONCLUSION
School safety should be a top priority for parents, school officials, and society.
It is not unreasonable to expect school officials to maintain a certain level of
legal protection from negligence claims in exchange for healthy and safe
students. Virginia has failed to do this and, instead, has put students at risk of
negligent supervision. The law in other states clearly allow for the existence of
a special relationship between schools and students. How severe will an act of
violence need to be for Virginia to join those states?
Protection of students is becoming more important as peer-on-peer bullying
becomes an increasing problem. If leniency in punishment and a lack of
deterrence is allowed to continue, the learning environment, and therefore, the
students, will suffer. This is a risk Virginia failed to assess; a risk that may
become a reality if Virginia does not soon change its mind. Choosing to protect
officials and denying the special relationship that exists between schools and
their students will not grant Virginia students the level of safety or education
they deserve. 198
Adequate protection by officials is only the starting point for safer schools.
The parents of students will also have to play a role in assuring that negative
consequences of violent behavior are enforced in the home as well. 199 While a
state cannot force a parent to raise their child in a certain manner, it can certainly
impose a duty on school officials to act in a manner that is in the best interest of
the child. Thus, the state must step up and make the first move towards safety.
With a special relationship established between schools and students, violence
can be stopped before it occurs and the focus can be turned back to educating
students, not policing them.

197. See Paul Riede, Syracuse Teachers Gather to Speak Out on School Violence, Disruptions,
(Feb. 14, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2014/
02/syracuse_teachers_gather_to_speak_out_on_school_violence_disruptions.html (noting the
concern that hesitation to stop a fight in progress can occur because teachers do not want to be
punished for being too forceful with students).
198. See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text (establishing that a heightened level of
care on officials would not be as burdensome as the Burns court believed and would increase the
safety provided to students).
199. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE FOR ALL
STUDENTS (2002), available at http://www.nasponline.org/communications/spawareness/
effdiscipfs.pdf (declaring that research shows the most successful school disciplinary methods are
those that can also be implemented by families).
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